After nearly two years of researching Cyberlux, the pieces seem to be falling into place—but not in the way I expected. Following this company’s twists and turns, poring over filings, scrutinizing deals, and chasing leads, one thing is becoming increasingly clear: Cyberlux operates in a world where the questions often speak louder than the answers.
Let’s start with FBD Group, a small Albanian company owned by Enida Rusi. Modest, successful enough to post a profit of $378,000 in 2020, but hardly the kind of business you’d expect to attract a multi-million-dollar deal. And yet, in October 2021, Cyberlux offered 200 million restricted shares at $0.10 each—a whopping $20 million valuation. The deal seemed poised to change everything for FBD and Rusi. But here’s the twist: Cyberlux’s filings show no evidence that Rusi ever received the shares.
Instead, those same 200 million shares ended up with Montague. But not at $0.10 per share. Montague received them at the mind-boggling bargain price of $0.001 each, under the label “debt settlement.” That’s a 99% discount. Debt for what? The filings don’t say. If Montague walked away with a sweetheart deal, what does that mean for Enida? What does it mean for FBD? FBD has not filed it’s company accounts in Albania since 2020.
Next, there’s Kreatx, a software company based in Albania, also caught up in Cyberlux’s acquisition spree. Offered 100 million restricted shares at $0.25 apiece—a $25 million deal—Kreatx, like FBD, appeared poised for big things. But just like FBD, there’s no record of Kreatx ever receiving its promised shares. Kreatx’s financials around that time tell a story of a modest operation, far removed from the kind of company you’d expect to command a $25 million valuation. So what exactly was Cyberlux acquiring here? Proprietary technology? Intellectual property? Or was this another deal that looked good on paper but was never about real business?
And then we get to Havas Group SAS, the most curious case of all. Cyberlux valued the deal at $40 million, offering 100 million restricted shares at $0.40 each. On top of that, part of the deal reportedly included land-related considerations. But what land? Where? How was it valued, and why did it warrant inclusion in the acquisition? The filings provide no clarity, and attempts to trace the land’s location or significance hit a wall. Adding to the intrigue, a search for “Havas Group SAS” only brings up a media and PR firm, with little evidence of energy related operations in Colombia, where Cyberlux claimed Havas was based.
And just like FBD and Kreatx, Havas apparently never received its promised shares, according to the filings. Was the land ever transferred?
Adding to the opacity, Cyberlux doesn’t report income by business unit. This omission raises the stakes: Did FBD, Kreatx, or Havas generate revenue when Cyberlux owned them? Or did these acquisitions exist purely on paper? Without income breakdowns, there’s no way to know if these companies produced anything of value—or if they simply served as placeholders for moving shares and funds. If these acquisitions were about business growth, why not show the numbers? What’s missing here?
At the same time Havas and Kreatx were left waiting for their shares, RB Capital Partners walked away with 250 million unrestricted shares. Coincidence? Or is this the thread that ties all these deals together? If FBD, Kreatx, and Havas didn’t receive their shares, who really benefited from these transactions?
Fast forward to September 2023. Cyberlux secures a $78.8 million contract, complete with a $38 million down payment. A win for the company, right? But less than 60 days later, Enida Rusi resurfaces—not in Albania, but in Miami, where she forms an LLC at 370 NE 75th Street. If that address sounds familiar, it’s because Cyberlux’s “Special Activities Group” was also based there. And here’s where it gets stranger: that same address is tied to a real estate agent with close ties to Colombia. Is this coincidence, or are we looking at the key to unlocking the whole story?
Then, in their financial filings, Cyberlux declared an $8.71 million loss related to divesting FBD, Kreatx, and Havas. What does that loss represent? Were these companies ever truly acquired, or were they just placeholders for moving money and shares? If the deals were real, why didn’t the promised shares materialize? And if they weren’t real, what exactly is Cyberlux hiding?
Taken together, the deals for FBD, Kreatx, and Havas represent $85 million in inflated valuations, all for companies that, on paper, seem to have little to no operational value. None of the promised shares appear to have been issued. Each acquisition ends in ambiguity, while the promised value evaporates into the ether. And throughout it all, we keep circling back to 370 NE 75th Street—a Miami address that seems to anchor this whole tangled web.
The questions practically write themselves. Why did Montague, not Rusi, benefit from the FBD deal? Why was Kreatx valued so highly when its financials suggested otherwise? What even is Havas Group SAS, and why does it seem to exist only in name? What role did the mysterious land play in the Havas deal? Who’s behind the real estate connections at 370 NE 75th Street? And most importantly, where did the $38 million down payment from that September defense contract actually go?
After two years of following Cyberlux, the pattern is impossible to ignore. These aren’t just isolated deals that went sideways. They’re pieces of a larger puzzle, one that seems designed to obscure the true movement of money, shares, and value. What started as a modest investigation into a defense contractor has turned into a labyrinth of questions. And as the pieces fall into place, it’s not the answers that stand out—it’s the silence.
All posts, articles, and op-eds about Cyberlux Corporation are grounded entirely in information sourced from publicly available court records, government documents, and financial disclosures filed with OTC Markets. This content is intended for informational purposes only—it’s not legal advice, it’s not financial guidance, and it’s definitely not an invitation to dive headfirst into investment decisions. Our interpretations, opinions, and conclusions stem exclusively from these accessible resources. Ultimate adjudication of legal matters rests with the courts and qualified legal professionals. As always, you’re encouraged to verify independently because, let’s face it, trust but verify is a motto that never goes out of style. If you believe there is an error in our reporting and have verifiable proof, we encourage you to present it, and we will promptly review and address any inaccuracies.
Personal insults and threats won’t change facts.
Sources Used
1. Cyberlux Corporation Financial Filings (2020–2024)
• Accessed through OTC Markets: www.otcmarkets.com
• Includes annual and quarterly reports, disclosures, and financial statements.
2. Albania Company Registries and Filings
• Sourced from OpenCorporates Albania: https://opencorporates.al
• Includes company registration details and financial statements for FBD Group SH.P.K., Kreatx, and other relevant entities.
3. Florida Department of State Division of Corporations Records
• Accessed via Florida Department of State Division of Corporations (Sunbiz): www.sunbiz.org
• Includes records for LLCs and corporate filings, including the registration of Enida Rusi’s LLC and related entities at 370 NE 75th Street, Miami.
4. Colombian Company Records
• Accessed via Registro Único Empresarial y Social (RUES) and Cámara de Comercio records.
• Focused on identifying Havas Group SAS’s existence and operations in Colombia.
