The reported fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria isn’t just a headline about a tyrant toppling—it’s the latest skirmish in the long-running proxy war between the United States and Russia. If the rumors of Assad’s ousting are true, it marks a momentous chapter in the great geopolitical chess game that has defined modern history. This is not a random upheaval or a purely local drama. No, this is the Middle East doing what it does best: serving as the stage for two global superpowers to duke it out without actually having to look each other in the eye.
The Middle East has always been a magnet for meddling. Its oil reserves, strategic location, and endless capacity for chaos have made it irresistible to anyone with an empire to run or a rival to humble. Since the Cold War, the region has been a playground for proxy battles, and Syria has long been one of the main attractions. Assad’s regime, propped up by Moscow, has been a critical piece of Russia’s Middle Eastern puzzle. For years, he’s been the anchor for Russian influence in the region, offering Moscow not just a partner but a full-fledged military outpost. Russian naval and air bases in Syria are more than just military assets—they’re symbols of power projection, reminders to the world that Russia still plays in the big leagues.
But Assad has been more than just Russia’s lackey. He’s also been Tehran’s golden boy, a vital cog in Iran’s regional ambitions. Syria is the bridge that connects Iran to its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and the wider Arab world. Through Assad, Iran funnels weapons, influence, and ideology, all aimed at challenging U.S. allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. Assad has been their man in Damascus, their firewall against Western dominance, and their middle finger to Washington.
The United States, of course, has had a complicated relationship with Syria. For decades, it watched Assad’s father, Hafez, and then Bashar himself, play regional spoiler without getting too worked up about it. But then came the Arab Spring, and suddenly, Assad’s brutal response to his own people sparked a civil war that drew in every player with a stake in the region. The U.S. wasn’t going to let Moscow and Tehran run the show unchallenged, so it backed opposition forces, at least half-heartedly. Yet, as anyone who’s followed American foreign policy knows, the U.S. is great at starting these projects and terrible at seeing them through. Washington’s support for the Syrian opposition was inconsistent, to put it kindly, and many assumed Assad’s grip on power would last as long as Moscow and Tehran kept the checks and weapons coming.
That’s what makes Assad’s reported fall so striking. If the United States had any hand in this—and let’s be honest, it probably did—this is the most substantial victory in the U.S.-Russia proxy war in years. For Moscow, Assad’s collapse would be a gut punch. Losing Syria means losing a key ally and, more importantly, a strategic foothold in the Middle East. The naval base at Tartus? Gone. The airbase at Khmeimim? Say goodbye to that, too. These aren’t just military outposts; they’re Russian flags planted in the sand, reminders that Putin can still swing his weight around. Losing them would be more than a logistical inconvenience—it would be a humiliation.
And don’t think for a second that Moscow’s other allies aren’t watching. If Russia can’t protect Assad, what does that say about its ability to safeguard other regimes that count on Moscow for security? Putin’s whole schtick is that he doesn’t abandon his friends, unlike those fickle Americans. Assad’s fall puts that narrative in the shredder, and the ripple effects could extend far beyond the Middle East.
Then there’s Iran, which is also having a terrible day. Assad’s Syria has been the linchpin of Iran’s strategy to extend its influence across the region. Without Damascus in friendly hands, Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah are in jeopardy, and its ability to project power into Lebanon and threaten Israel gets a lot more complicated. The fall of Assad would be a strategic nightmare for Tehran, undoing years of effort and billions of dollars spent propping up its embattled ally.
For the United States, however, this is what strategists like to call a “big deal.” If Assad’s fall can be traced back to American maneuvering—whether through support for rebels, economic sanctions, or sheer persistence—it’s a powerful statement that Washington still has the capacity to shape events on the global stage. For President Biden, it would be a foreign policy win that’s rare in its clarity. After years of being slammed for a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and accused of letting China and Russia run amok, this would be a feather in his cap, a chance to remind the world that the U.S. is still a force to be reckoned with.
But let’s not pop the champagne just yet, because history has a way of turning these victories into headaches. Think back to other great proxy battles the U.S. has “won.” Afghanistan in the 1980s comes to mind, where helping the mujahideen kick out the Soviets seemed like a fantastic idea—until those same forces morphed into the Taliban and invited al-Qaeda to the party. Or Iraq, where toppling Saddam Hussein led to, well, the mess we’re still dealing with today. Proxy wars have a nasty habit of leaving behind power vacuums, and Syria is unlikely to be an exception.
If Assad is truly out, what comes next? Syria isn’t a country that lends itself to easy solutions. It’s a patchwork of rival factions, sectarian divides, and warlords who have grown quite comfortable running their own little fiefdoms. The collapse of Assad’s regime could just as easily pave the way for Islamist groups to seize control, plunging the country into even deeper chaos. The U.S. might celebrate Assad’s departure, but the bill for that victory could come due when Washington is asked to help clean up the aftermath.
And let’s not forget what this means for Donald Trump, should he return to the White House. Trump’s foreign policy has always been a mix of isolationist bluster and transactional deal-making. He’s made it clear he doesn’t like expensive foreign entanglements, and a post-Assad Syria would be just that. The country’s fragmentation and potential for extremist resurgence would demand a level of U.S. engagement that Trump has shown little interest in maintaining. At the same time, Assad’s fall puts Russia in a weaker position, which could complicate Trump’s historically friendly overtures to Putin. Navigating a Middle East where Russia is scrambling to recover and Iran is reeling would require finesse, and finesse isn’t exactly the Trump administration’s calling card.
What’s clear is that Assad’s reported ousting is not just a story about Syria; it’s a chapter in the much larger book of U.S.-Russia rivalry. For decades, these two powers have fought their battles indirectly, using proxy conflicts as a way to test each other’s resolve without escalating to outright war. From Afghanistan to Ukraine to Syria, the game remains the same, even if the players and stakes shift. Assad’s fall is a significant moment in this ongoing contest, but it’s not the endgame. It’s merely the latest move on a board that stretches from Damascus to Kyiv to the South China Sea.
Whether Assad’s ousting turns out to be a decisive victory for the United States or another messy episode in the saga of Middle Eastern instability will depend on what happens next. But one thing is certain: the proxy war between the U.S. and Russia is far from over, and the next battle is already waiting in the wings.
